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Case No. 20140398 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE CHARTER SCHOOLS, LLC, a Utah 
Limited. Liability Corporation, 
Plaintiff· Appellant, 
vs. 
MARTEL MENLOVE, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the 
Utah State Office of Education and State School Board, and JENEFER 
YOUNGFIELD, in her official capacity as School Construction and 
Facilities Safety Specialist, Utah State Office of Education, 
Defendants·Appellees. 
Defendants/Appellees' Answer Brief 
Defendants/Appellees, Martel Menlove and Jenefer Youngfield, in 
their official capacities as employees of the Utah State Office of 
Education, respectfully submit this brief in response to Citizens for 
Responsible Charter Schools, LLC's (Citizens) opening brief on appeal. 
Introduction 
Lacking standing to do so, Citizens brought suit against the 
Appellees, two State of Office of Education employees acting in their 
official capacities1, to enjoin each from issuing Dixie Montessori 
Academy a school construction project number, without which the 
construction of the Montessori Academy could not commence. Citizens 
now appeals the trial court's order dismissing that suit, raising before 
this court primarily extraneous and unpreserved contentions. 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court possesses jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West 2009). 
Counter Statement of Issues Presented 
1. Citizens lacked standing to maintain its action in the trial 
court. 
The test for traditional standing requires a party seeking judicial 
relief to establish that it has or will suffer a distinct and palpable 
injury as result of a defendant's actions such that the party has a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Here, Citizens was 
formed on the same day that its complaint was filed, and for the 
purpose of providing social advocacy and management and consulting 
1 Martel Menlove is no longer the State School 
Superintendent nor employed by the State Office of Education, 
having retired before this appeal was taken. 
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services. Citizens owns no real property that would be affected by 
construction of a charter school, nor is there any other, articulable 
harm to Citizens, but its claims rest on those of its purported members. 
Did the district err when it dismissed Citizens's complaint based on a 
lack of standing? 
A. Standard of Review 
The grant of a motion to dismiss based on a lack of standing 
raises a mixed question that is more law- than fact-like, and that the 
court reviews for correctness, conceding no deference to the trial court. 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 7 4, ,I 
13, if 15, 148 P.3d 960. 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue was raised by Appellees and interveners through trial 
briefs and in oral argument, R. 1004, PI Tr., generally; R. 405-421, 424-
434, 973-982, and was ruled on by the court through its oral and 
written rulings. R. 1004, PI Tr., p. 42-45; R. 997-98. A copy of the trial 
court's order is attached as Addendum A. 
-3-
2. Citizens failed to raise its alternative standing claims in 
the trial court and they are not preserved for appeal. 
Citizens resisted the Appellees' and interveners' motions to 
dismiss in the trial court, and there, responded to questions from the 
bench, but contended neither that it met the traditional test for 
standing as an association, hor argued that it met the alternative test 
for standing under the public interest exception. Did Citizens fail to 
properly preserve those issues for appeal? 
A. Standard of Review 
Citizens's failure to preserve its alternate standing arguments 
presents an issue unique to this appeal and for which there is no 
standard of appellate review. But to preserve an issue for appeal, the 
plaintiff must present it to the trial court "in such a way that the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule on the issue." Pratt v. Nelson, 2001 
UT 41, iJ 15, 164 P.3d 66. Issues not preserved in the trial court are 
waived on subsequent appeal. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of 
Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
Citizens's alternate claims are unpreserved. 
-4-
3. The trial court's expedited briefing schedule was 
necessitated by Citizens's requests for a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction and assented to by its counsel. 
Through counsel on April 2, 2014, Citizens filed a complaint and 
14' ex parte motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction. The following day, Citizens submitted its supporting 
memorandum, and the trial granted Citizens's requested TRO. With 
the assent of counsel on April 3, the trial court set a hearing to be held 
on April 11, to consider Citizens's request for a preliminary injunction, 
calling for prehearing briefs to be filed on or before 5:00 p.m., on April 
9. By assenting to a time line that was necessitated by its own motion, 
did Citizens waive its unpreserved claim that the trial court deprived it 
of an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
A. Standard of Review 
This issue was also unpreserved in the trial court, but is 
presented for the first time here. It is therefore unique to this appeal 
and has no appellate standard of review. 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
Issues not preserved in the trial court are waived on subsequent 
v, appeal. See Espinal, 797 P.2d at 413. 
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4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Citizens the opportunity to file an amended complaint naming a 
homeowner as an additional plaintiff. 
When justice so requires, leave to amend shall be freely given. 
But when the need to amend results from a failed calculation or other 
dilatory conduct, discretion may be exercised to deny leave instead. 
Did the trial court act within the bounds of reason when, after granting 
a TRO to a party who had no standing to seek it, the court later denied 
that party leave to amend its complaint to name, instead, a party 
known to have standing to proceed. 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews an order denying a party leave to amend its 
complaint for an abuse of discretion, overturning that decision only if it 
exceeds the limits of reasonableness. Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 
UT 68, ,r 15, 243 P.3d 1275. 
B. Preservation 
This issue was raised orally by Citizens during the April 11 
evidentiary hearing, R. 1004, PI Tr. pp. 13-14, 19-20, 24, 39-40, and 
was ruled on by the trial court through its oral and written rulings. R. 
1004, PI Tr., p. 44-49; R. 997-98. See Addendum A. 
·6· 
Determinative Statutes or Rules 
No statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions are solely 
determinative of the issues on appeal. But the test for standing is a 
product of Utah's case law. To the extent statutory citations or text are 
helpful to this Court's analysis, they are set out in the text of Appellees' 
brief. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Aimed at stopping the construction of a neighborhood charter 
school, and to protect themselves from personal liability, a group of 
Washington City homeowners formed a Utah limited liability company 
for the purpose of bringing suit to enjoin action by the Utah State 
Office of Education. This appeal addresses the trial court's order 
dismissing that suit based on Citizens's lack of standing to press claims 
personal to its members, or alternatively, to amend its suit to name an 
individual homeowner who may have had standing to proceed. 
Proceedings, Relevant Facts, and Disposition Below 
On April 2, 2014, Citizens filed a complaint and motion in the 
Fifth District Court in St. George, seeking 1) immediate entry of a 
-7-
temporary restraining order enjoining the issuance of school 
construction permit and thereby halting the planned construction of a 
charter school, and 2) preliminary and permanent injunctions striking 
the Utah School Construction Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 53-20-101, as 
unconstitutional. R. 1-4 (compl.); 15·17 (motion); 18-305 (exhibits). 
Citizens filed a supporting memorandum the next day, and the court 
held a hearing respecting its request for a TRO. R. 309-19. The 
Appellees received notice only that day, and through counsel 
participated by phone in Salt Lake City. R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 2. At the 
close of that hearing, and to preserve the status quo, the trial court 
issued the requested TRO that restrained the Appellees, on behalf of 
the State Office of Education, from issuing a construction project 
number. R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 41. 
Noting the TRO would expire by its own terms in 10 days, the 
trial court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on Friday, April 
11, 2014. R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 43. The court inquired of counsel 
whether each would be prepared to proceed with an evidentiary 
hearing on that date. R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 44. On Citizens's behalf, 
counsel indicated he "would like a little more time," but continued, "I 
-8-
can make it happen." Id. Then, to as$ist in the upcoming PI hearing 
and to accommodate the expedited schedule necessitated by entry of 
the TRO (that would expire on or by April 13, a Sunday), the trial court 
directed the parties to submit hearing briefs by 5:00 p.m., on 
Wednesday, April 9. R. 1009, TRO Tr., pp. 45-6. 
On the date set out by the trial court for doing so, Citizens and 
Appellees each submitted a trial brief, R. 441-51 (brief); 452-964 
(exhibits) and R. 424- 434, respectively. Also on April 9, Dixie 
Montessori Academy moved to intervene in the court proceedings, R. 
368-378, and filed a motion joining in the arguments of Boyer Dixie. R. 
405-421. Boyer Dixie, LC moved to intervene on April 4, R. 329-338, 
and on April 10, filed its own memorandum opposing citizen's .PI 
request. R. 973-982. 
The trial court held a hearing on April 11, 2014, at which 
questions respecting Citizens's standing were raised. R. 1004, PI Tr., p. 
5. Citizens's counsel responded to those questions, principally arguing 
that it should be granted leave to amend its complaint to add an 
additional plaintiff - a purported adjacent landowner - and also, to 
renew its request for a TRO. R. 1004, PI Tr., pp. 13-14, 19-20, 24, 39-
-9-
40. But finding that Citizens lacked a personal interest in the outcome 
and could therefore show no distinct or palpable injury, the trial court 
held Citizens lacked standing. R. 1004, PI Tr., pp. 44-45. The court 
also determined that because it lacked a plaintiff with proper standing 
to proceed, the court could not properly exercise jurisdiction over the 
TRO or to grant a preliminary injunction, but its recourse was to 
dismiss Citizens's complaint instea~. Id. In so doing, the trial court 
denied Citizens's motion to amend a complaint it filed 9 days earlier. 
Background Facts and Pertinent Law 
Boyer Dixie and Dixie Montessori agree to construct a Charter 
School. 
In July 2013, the interveners Boyer Dixie and Dixie Montessori 
entered into an agreement to purchase land and construct a building 
for use as a charter school. R. 419, BD memo at iii. After acquiring a 
large parcel of land located at 645 West 1100 North, Washington City, 
Utah, id .. Boyer Dixie applied to Washington City to subdivide the 
parcel into 2 lots. R. 420, BD memo at iv. The application did not seek 
approval from Washington City to construct a charter school. Id. 
·IO-
Despite the limited scope of Boyer Dixie's application, residents 
-<:1 opposed to construction of the school, appeared and opposed Boyer's 
application at a November 2013 Washington City Planning Commission 
ViP Meeting.2 Id. To address those concerns, which centered primarily on 
increased traffic and decreased safety on Fairway Drive, Boyer Dixie 
\ 
requested and paid for a traffic study to be prepared by Horrocks 
Engineering. Id.; R. 66-83. 
Months later, in February 2014, Boyer Dixie closed on its 
purchase of the land parcel, and in March 2014, Dixie Montessori 
applied to the State of Office of Education for approval of the proposed 
charter school and issuance of the required school construction permit 
number. Id.; R. 432, Appellees' memo at 3; R. 84-282 (application). 
Also in March, Washington City contracted with Metro Analytics, to 
review the Horrocks Engineering traffic study. R. 285-289. 
State school construction requirements. 
The Utah State Office of Education (USOE) is vested by Utah's 
2 A second planning commission meeting was held in 
January 2014, which was again attended by residents opposed to 
the school. The planning commission denied Boyer Dixie's 
subdivision application at that meeting. 
-11-
Constitution with the general control and supervision of the state 
system of public education. See Utah Const. Art. 10, § 3. To further 
that goal, the Legislature has enacted statutes and the USOE has 
adopted rules governing public school construction and approval. 
Respecting charter schools, Utah's administrative code states, "Before 
any ... charter school construction project begins, ... a charter school 
shall obtain a construction permit number from the [USOE] and 
complete and submit construction project identification forms provided 
by the USOE .... " Utah Admin Code. R. 277-4 71 ·3(F). Satisfied with 
the accuracy and completion of the required forms, the "the USOE shall 
provide a construction project number," id. R. 277-471-3(A)(2)(c), which 
nurnber is the equivalent of a building permit. R. 432, Appellees' 
memo, p~ 3. 
Local or municipal zoning laws cannot be used to prohibit the 
location of a charter school: "A charter school shall be considered a 
permitted use in all zoning districts within a municipality." Utah Code 
Ann. § I0-9a-305(7)(a). But a charter school's installation, construction 
and operation, "shall conform to any applicable land use ordinance of 
any municipality." Id.§ 10-9a-305(1)(a). And "[i]n addition to any 
-12-
other remedies provided by law, ... [a] municipality may institute an 
injunction ... or other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent, 
enjoin, abate, or remove [an] improper installation, improvement, or 
~ use." Id.§ 10-9a-305(1)(b). 
On receiving notice from a charter school under Utah Code Ann.§ 
\ 
~ 53A-20-108(1) of the purchase of a school site or proposed construction 
of a charter school building, representatives of the local government 
and charter school shall meet &nd confer about 1) any concerns each 
may have, "including potential community impacts and site safety;" 2) 
the availability of infrastructure; and 3) and the assessment of any 
municipal fees associated with the project. Id.§ 58A-20-108(1)(b). 
Subj'ect to those provisions: 
IA] charter school shall coordinate the siting of a new school 
with the municipality in which the school is to be located, to: 
(a) avoid or mitigate existing and potential traffic 
hazards, including consideration of the impacts between 
the new school and future highways; and 
(b) maximize school, student, and site safety. 
Id. § 10-9a-305(4)(a), (b). 
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Dixie Montessori's request for a school construction permit 
number. 
In conformity with that scheme, on March 12, 2014, in her 
capacity as the School Construction and Facilities Safety Specialist for 
the USOE, Appellee Youngfield received Dixie Montessori's request for 
a school construction project number. R. 431, Appellees' memo at p. 5. 
Attached to request, among other things, was documentation 
demonstrating Dixie Montessori's compliance with Section 10·9a· 
305(4), a recitation of information and concerns raised by Washington 
City during those meetings, and copies of the Horrocks Engineering 
traffic study and Metro Analytics' review of the same. R. 439·31, 
Appellees' memo at 5-6. 
As part of her review of those materials, Appellee Youngfield 
requested additional information from Washington City about "any 
additional life safety concerns" the City may have and requested that it 
"identify all of the life safety concerns for Dixie Montessori." R. 300. If 
no concerns were forthcoming, USOE intended to issue Dixie 
Montessori its requested project number. R. 300. That process halted, 
however, on April 3, 2014 when the trial court issued the TRO. 
·14· 
Summary of Argument 
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that at its core permits 
courts to adjudicate only those cases fit for judicial resolution. Under 
liP its traditional test, a party establishes standing by ·showing that it has 
l 
or will suffer an injury that'has a causal relationship between the 
\ 
challenged action and requested relief, and for which the court may 
fashion an adequate remedy. Below, Citizens, a limited liability 
corporation formed on the very day suit was brought, failed to satisfy 
even the first prong of the test for standing. But seeking to press 
claims belonging solely .to its members, -Citizens could not show it 
possessed a stake of its own in the outcome of the judicial proceedings. 
The. trial court correctly dislll:issed Citizens's complaint based on a lack 
of standing. 
And converse to Citizens's claims on appeal, the court did not err 
by failing to grant Citizens standing under an alternate means. But 
Citizens did not advance any alternate claims in that court, and it has 
~ therefore waived them on appeal. 
What is more, having consciously elected its chosen path; to form 
_;p an LLC, not name individuals homeowners who may have possessed 
-15-
standing to proceed, Citizens has shown no reason why the trial court 
erred by denying it leave to amend. But leave, is a discretionary act, 
based in the a court's equitable powers. A party seeking equity - here 
discretionary amendment - must first do equity. But 'by supverting the ~ 
normal pleading rules, and naming an LLC not a party, Citizens's 
\ 
hands are unclean. Amendment under those circumstances was not 
warranted. The trial court's order, therefore, was reasonable. It should 
be affirmed. 
Argument 
I. C_itizens lacked standing to challenge the USOE's issuance of 
a charter school construction project number. 
Utah standing law "operates as a gatekeeper to the courthouse," 
and permits in "only those cases that are fit for judicial resolutiQn." 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Ed., 2006 UT 7 4, ,r 
17, 148 P.3d 960 (quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The doctrine of standing requires courts to "confine themselves" to only 
those disputes best resolved through the judicial process. Id. Utah law 
recognizes two means _by which a party can establish standing - by 
·16· 
~ 
traditional or alternative tests. Here, Citizens cannot satisfy the 
traditional test, and it failed to raise any alternative arguments in the 
proceedings below. The trial court's decision therefore is correct and 
should be affirmed. 
A. Citizens cannot meet the traditional test for standing. 
Under the traditional test, a plaintiff establishes that it has 
standing by showing it has or will suffer a "distinct and palpable 
injury" that gives it a "personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute." Utah Chapter of Sierra Club, 2006 UT 7 4, ,r 19 (quoting 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). To establish standing under this test, the plaintiff 
must show that 1) it has or will be "adversely affected" by the 
challenged action (injury); 2) a causal relationship exists between the 
alleged injury, the challenged action, and relief sought (causation); and 
3) the requested relief will redress the alleged harm (redressability). 
Id. 
Here, Citizens is a Utah limited liability corporation formed on 
the very day suit was filed and for the stated purposes of "provid[ing] 
consulting and management services, including social advocacy that 
·17· 
might be needs or rights based." R. 1004, PI Tr., p. 9. Citizens owns no 
real property, but maintains an office in a home located on Fairway 
Drive, in which an LLC-purchased computer and printer are situated. 
R. 1004, PI Tr, pp. 17-18. In addition to "social advocacy," one of the 
acknowledged purposes for which Citizens was formed was to shield 
and protect local homeowners from liability should the interveners seek 
relief from entry of a wrongful injunction or TRO. R. 1004, PI, Tr. P. 
28. 
An LLC, or limited liability company, is a distinct legal entity 
that owns no property and that cannot assert the personal claims of its 
members. Because an LLC is not interchangeable with its members, it 
is not a proper party to sue on behalf of personal injuries alleged by the 
same. See, e.g., CHMM, LLC v. Freeman Marine Equip., Inc., No. 3:12~ 
CV-01484-ST, slip op. 2014 WL 6610007, *3 (D. Ore Oct. 30, 2014); In 
re. Settoon Towing, LLC, No. 07·1263, 2009 WL 4730969, *5 (ED La 
Dec. 4, 2009). 
Below, Citizens improperly sought to press a claim for immediate, 
injunctive relief based only on alleged harm to the personal property or 
interests of its members, i.e., property and interests that Citizens does 
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not own. It accordingly lacked standing. The trial court's order 
dismissing the TRO and Citizens's underlying complaint is correct. It 
should be affirmed. 
B. Citizens made no alternative claim for standing -
whether as an association or under the public interest 
exception - and those issues are therefore not preserved for 
appeal. 
Citizens acknowledges none of the law set out above, nor does 
it squarely address, if at all, the actual basis for the trial court's 
~ ruling- i.e., that Citizens failed to show it had a personal stake in 
the outcome of the proceedings. But Citizens dedicates six pages of 
VP briefing to claims that it did not raise and to arguments it failed to 
make in the proceeding below. Op. Br., pp. 10-16. Namely, on pages 
10 to 13 of its opening brief, Citizens argues it possesses 
associational standing under principles announced in Utah Chapter 
of Sierra Club. Then, on pages 13 to 16, Citizens contends, in the 
alternative, that it meets the test for public interest standing. 
Neither contention, however, was raised when Citizens was 
before the trial court. But pressed there, to advance any other 
arguments "why," in the absence of a "personal stake in the outcome 
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of the trial," Citizens "would be situated to be able to raise these 
claims?", R. 1004, P Tr., pp. 16-17, counsel pointed only to Citizens's 
address, id., p. 17:I-7; Citizens's intellectual property, id., p. 17:23, 
and to a printer and computer Citizens purchased for use in 
disseminating information. Id., p. 18=3-7. Whether as an association 
or under the public interest exception, Citizens made no alternate 
claim for standing. But its arguments made for the first time here 
are unpreserved and therefore improper. 
It is long-settled that "an appellant must properly preserve an 
issue in the district court before it will be reviewed on appeal." 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998); see 
also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). To preserve an issue for this Court's 
appellate review, a party must first raise it in the trial court, 
"because 'a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on the 
issue."' O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ,r 18, 217 P.3d 704. To do so "(1) 
the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the preservation 
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requirement, the Utah Supreme Court has held, "is to put the judge 
on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for 
corrections at that time in the proceedings." Id. 
Below, Citizens presented neither its associational or public 
interest contentions. It cited that court to none of the authority that 
it cites to now, and it offered no evidence of the type necessary to 
satisfy either alternative claim. But at best, and at most, Citizens 
pointed to a homeowner - Gary Davis - whom it would name in an 
amended or refiled action, and who, in a subsequent proceeding may 
be able to put forward evidence of the homeowner's personal stake, 
and standing, therefore, to make a claim.3 Having deprived the trial 
court of the opportunity to consider either alternate contention for 
3 In addition to being unpreserved, Citizens's associational 
standing claim is also unsupported. But unlike the Sierra Club, 
Citizens put forward no information in the proceedings below to 
show how one named, and several anonymous homeowners, had a 
sufficient personal interest in the outcome of the litigation to vest 
standing in Citizens as result of the personal interests of its 
members. See Utah Chapter of Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ,r 21 
(finding Sierra Club had stan~ing because its members met the 
traditional test for standing based on a showing of their 
"identified personal adverse effects, sufficient causation, and 
redressability .") 
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the first time when there, or having failed to explain to this Court 
why it should review Citizens's unpreserved claim, see Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(5)(B) (requiring party to include statement of grounds to 
support consideration of unpreserved issue), Citizens has waived 
its opportunity for appellate review. This court should not reach it. 
See.Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 
1990) (issues not raised in trial court are waived on subsequent 
appeal); Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r 23, 16 P.3d 540 (issues not 
raised in opening brief are considered waived any will not be 
considered on appeal). 
II. By moving under Rule 65A and seeking immediate entry of 
a TRO and other injunctive relief, Citizens waived any 
additional notice or time to respond under Rule 7. 
Citizens claims that because it only received notice of 
Appellees' and interveners' concerns respecting Citizens's standing 
on April 9, it was deprived of adequate notice and opportunity to 
respond. That argument is unavailing. But the expedited schedule 
for briefing, and in turn argument, was necessitated in the first 
instance by the nature of Citizens's complaint. Having filed its 
complaint under civil rule 65A, and seeking immediate entry of a 
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TRO, Citizens, not the court or other parties put the case on the fast 
~ track. 
By its very nature, a TRO is temporary in nature and by its 
~ owns terms will expire if not extended within 10 days of the date on 
which it was entered. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). Here, Citizens filed 
a complaint on April 2, seeking preliminary and permanent 
injunctive relief, and also immediate entry of a TRO. Citizens's 
supporting memorandum was filed, and a TRO hearing was held and 
the request granted on April 3.4 That order would expire by 
operation of law on April 13 - a Sunday. Consequently, the trial 
court's order setting a hearing on Citizens's preliminary injunction 
for April 11 was abundantly sound. It was also agreed to by counsel 
for Citizens. R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 44 (" ... I can make it happen. 
It's my motion.") 
4 Notable here, despite court granting Citizens's TRO 
request that day,· the trial court raised its own questions 
concerning Citizens's standing. See R. 1009, TRO Tr., p. 25 (court 
questioning whether Washington City, not Citizens, was a proper 
party plaintiff); and id., p. 31 (court acknowledging that Citizens 
had not named individuals who may be harmed by the TRO). 
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All of this, however, matters not. Below, neither Appellees' nor 
interveners moved under civil rule 7 to dismiss Citizens's complaint, 
but each raised standing as a defense and in response to Citizens's PI 
request. 5 What is more, even prior to April 9, Citizens and its 
5 In effort to show it preserved a rule 7 objections, Citizens 
twice points to the following statement by counsel: "[This is] 
indicative of the due process. The only reason that we didn't have 
the iuxury of exploring every possible contingency was we were 
dealing with the notice given at seven, eight o'clock at night for 
action to be taken the following day." Op. Br. pp. 3, 17-18 
(quoting R. 1004, Tr., p. 20). But when read in context, this 
passage neither signaled nor preserved Citizens's rule 7 
contentions. But the statement was offered in response to a 
question from the court as to whether Citizens was prepared that 
day with evidence in support of its PI request: 
THE COURT: So were you prepared today to give 
evidence of how the LLC would be affected? 
COUNSEL: I think, Your Honor, I don't think 
so. You know, that's not -you know, I'd like to 
amend. I don't know what - the practical matter, 
I mean, if I need to· beg the Court to amend ~ I 
don't know what the court would like me to do. 
It's a simple fix. The defendants, all counsel at 
the table know who is involved. It's the same 
people who are involved in the LLC. It seems 
that we would be creating such a minor, technical 
violation, that can be remedied. I've got it right 
here. I've got an amended complaint that I 
prepared prior to coming here. I've a got a second 
motion for temporary restraining order. I've got 
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counsel had every reason to know standing was a problem. But an 
acknowledged purposes for forming Citizens was to permit 
disgruntled homeowners to pursue legal recourse without putting 
their homes or personal assets at risk. R. 1004, PI Tr., p. 28. 
Finally, standing is a jurisdictional requirement, the lack of which 
\:JP may be raised at any time, including sua sponte by the trial court. 
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, 1 11, 299-P.3d 1098. Because the 
~ trial court's order resolved a jurisdictional issue and did so at the 
proper time and in a proper manner, it should be upheld. 
that prepared. That is - but, again, I could go 
back to that's indicative of the due process. The 
only reason we didn't have the luxury of exploring 
every possible contingency was we were dealing 
with the notice given at seven, eight o'clock at 
night for action to be taken the-following day. 
Rather than making the list of hundreds of people 
and typing up every nam·e just to get the header 
done on my pleadings, we formed an association 
of two homeowners. That's how we got to this 
point. 
R. 1004, PI Tr., pp. 19-20. 
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III. The trial court did not err by denying Citizens's request to 
amend its complaint, but the court's order was a proper 
exercise of its discretion. 
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that a.party must 
satisfy before a trial court may reach its claims. Gregory, 2013 UT 
18, ,r 9. Citizens was not a proper plaintiff in the proceeding below, 
\ 
and it accordingly had no standing to pursue a TRO -which was 
granted - or later, to seek preliminary or permanent injunctive 
relief. But lacking a party with standing to proceed on that date, 
the trial court was barred on April 11, 2014, from reaching any 
additional claims and the court correctly vacated its TRO and also 
dismissed Citizens's complaint. And because it found.- and was 
offered - no reasonable basis to do so, the trial court appropriately 
denied Citizens's oral motion seeking to leave t_o amend its 
complaint. 
To defeat the trial court's order, Citizens raises unpreserved 
claims which are based on Citizens's preferred reading of procedural 
rules, and its reliance on inapposite authority. At its core, Citizens 
argues that in the face of an alleged, or other real party in interest, a 
trial court may never deny a party that lacks standing leave to 
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amend. Citizens errs.6 But faced below with a party that had no 
standing to proceed, the trial court was faced, as well, with a choice: 
1) to dismiss Citizens's complaint without prejudice based on 
Citizens's lack of standing; or 2) to grant Citizens leave to name an 
additional plaintiff, whose identity and interest was all times known 
\iJb to Citizens, but in whose pecuniary interest Citizens was formed in 
the first instance. The trial court reasonably selected the first 
option. 
Utah civil rule 15(a) sets the standard for granting leave to 
amend a complaint. It states that "when justice so requires," leave 
to amend "shall be freely given." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Underlying 
6 As with most of its other claims on appeal, before the trial 
court Citizens pointed to neither civil rules 17(a) or 19, nor even 
to civil rule 15(a) on which it now relies. Citizens's arguments, 
therefore, that rely exclusively on those rules and appellate 
decisions maqe thereunder are unpreserved and waived by it on 
appeal. 
What is more, Citizens overstates the import of rules 17 and 
19 and points to inapposite authority in support of the same. See 
Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, ,r,r 31-34, 323 P.3d 571 (expressing 
concern that court denied leave to name as additional defendants, 
parties who were essential to plaintiffs constitutional claims); 
Intermountain Physical Med. Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 
P.2d 1131, 1132-33 (taking issue with fact that after denying 
leave to amend, court dismissed action with prejudice). 
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rule 15 is the goal of having real controversies, between actual 
parties, presented and decided. See Savage v. Utah Youth Vi.11., 2004 
UT 102, ,r 9, 104 P.3d 1242. Rule 15's liberal standard, however, is 
not without limits. See Hudgens v. Propser, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ,r18, 
243 P.3d 1275. 
Id. 
Where an amended complaint is sought, 'as the result of 
dilatory motive, bad faith, or unreasonable neglect,' a 
district court has discretion to deny leave to amend. 
Here, apart from lacking a party with proper standing to 
proceed, there is abundant evidence in the record on which to sustain 
the trial court's order. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r 10, 52 
P.3d 1158. But it is settled that a court on appeal may affirm a trial 
court's decision "'if it is•sustainable on any legal ground or theory on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action .... "' Id. 
(quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ,r 18, 29 P.3d 1225). 
Prior to bringing suit in the trial court below, counsel for Citizens' 
was aware of Gary Davis - Citizens's preferred, substitute or 
additional plaintiff - as well as numerous other homeowners who, 
-28-
unlike an LLC formed on the day suit is filed possessed a personal 
stake in the outcome of Citizens's litigation. None, however, was 
named, but each preferred to litigate their personal interests while 
~ preserving their personal assets. 
MR. MATKIN: ... We'have an email that says, 'Jason 
formed a limited liability group with no assets. This entity 
·~ is actually the party suing the State. Thus, we can all take 
part as much as we want without fear of liability.' 
R. 1004, PI Tr., p. 28. 
By consciously choosing to name only it, an LLC - with no 
stake in the case, and no property or interests to be harmed -
vi Citizens cannot now be heard to complain. But whether for delay, 
improper motive, or ~imply neglect, the conscious failure to name a 
ViP party with standing to proceed neither warranted the trial court's 
exercise of discretion·in favor or amendment below, nor warrants 
this Court's order striking the trial court's election not to do so. But 
a party seeking equity - here discretionary amendment - must have 
clean hands with which to seek it. See Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 
241, ,r 7, 95 P.3d 1221 (a party seeking an equitable remedy must 
come to equity with clean hands). The trial court's election to deny 
·29· 
Citizens's oral motion to amend is not error, but the proper exercise 
of that court's reason.and discretion .. The order should be affirmed. 
Conclusion 
In proceedings below, the trial court correctly dismissed 
Citizens's complaint based on the LLC's lack of a personal stake in 
\ 
the outcome, and a lack of standing, therefore, to press a claim. That 
order is sound, based on the arguments of record, and should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLYsqbmitted this 8th day.of April, 2015. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASIHNGTO.N\<:JQ,UNTY, STATE or UTAJ.J 
Citizens for Responsible Charter Schools, 
· LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTELL MENLOVE in his official capacity 
as Superintendent of the Utah State Office of 
. Education, and State School Board; and 
JENEFER YOUNGFIELD, in her official 
capacity as School Construction and Facilities 
Safety Specialist, Utah State Office of 
Education, 
Defendants. 
ORDER (PROPOSED) 
Civil No. 140500176 
Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox 
This matter having come before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction. The Court having heard arguments from all 
parties determines that the Plaintiff, a limited liability corporation known as The Citizens for 
May 1~. 2014 03:09 PM 
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Responsible Charter Schools, is requesting a Declaratory Judgment, has no substantial interest in 
the subject matter of the litigation, has no personal stake in this matter, and has no standing to 
proceed in this matter. 
Therefore, the Court Orders this matter be dismissed and the outstanding Temporary 
Restraining Order withdrawn and dismissed. 
(End of Document) 
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